POST /api/revocation/lookup
Ask the key server what its revocation store says about one certificate.
Reads the store and changes nothing. The answer names the policy that governs the
certificate's issuer (policyKey, policy), so it also says what a login presenting this
certificate would be held to.
Authentication
Send the session id as Authorization: Bearer <session id>, and an RFC 9449 DPoP proof in the DPoP header if your session is bound to a key. The two are required together, not as alternatives — see Authenticating and Proving you hold your key.
There is no session cookie on any response and none is read on any request. Do not set credentials: "include" on a browser fetch.
Request
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
certificate | string | yes | One DER X.509 certificate, base64. A PEM block is refused by name (CERTIFICATE_NOT_DER). |
Example
{
"certificate": "..."
}
Responses
200
The key server's answer.
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
status | string (REVOKED, NOT_LISTED, NO_EVIDENCE) | yes | REVOKED -- the certificate is on stored evidence. NOT_LISTED -- its issuer holds evidence and the serial is not on it. NO_EVIDENCE -- its issuer holds none. |
issuer | string | yes | |
serial | string | yes | The serial number |
revocationDate | string or null | no | Null unless REVOKED. |
reason | string or null | no | The CRL entry's reason code |
thisUpdate | string or null | no | Of the evidence consulted; null for NO_EVIDENCE. |
nextUpdate | string or null | no | |
policyKey | string | yes | Which parameter's policy answered: Policy.X509.Revocation.Issuer.<digest>, Policy.X509.Revocation.Default, or built-in. |
policy | string | yes | That policy's canonical text. |
digest | string or null | no | The issuing anchor's digest |
detail | string | no |
Example
{
"status": "REVOKED",
"issuer": "...",
"serial": "...",
"revocationDate": "...",
"reason": "...",
"thisUpdate": "...",
"nextUpdate": "...",
"policyKey": "...",
"policy": "...",
"digest": "...",
"detail": "..."
}
400
The request was refused before anything was sent to the key server.
Most 400s on this surface carry code: BAD_REQUEST and a detail naming the field and
saying what the key server would otherwise have done with it. A large share of them exist
because the value would have been ACCEPTED downstream and quietly meant something else --
an empty string that reaches the wire as "mint a new key", a zero-length identifier that
names no object, a numeric flag word that clears bits the caller did not name.
INVALID_ARGUMENT is the one 400 that DID reach the key server: the key server itself
refused the argument (ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT), and detail is its own sentence. On
POST /api/certificates/enroll that is a certificate that cannot authenticate --
certificate not permitted for authentication: keyUsage is present without digitalSignature (...), ... extendedKeyUsage is present without clientAuth (...), or
certificate expired at enrolment: notAfter <UTC> ... -- and a multi-certificate body
that carries one such leaf persists nothing.
401
No live session, or a DPoP proof that did not verify.
SESSION_NOT_FOUND -- the credential names no session this Gateway holds.
SESSION_EXPIRED -- it aged out. Both carry reauth: true; obtain a new credential
rather than retrying.
PROOF_* -- the sender constraint refused. See the DPoP section of this document for the
full table; PROOF_MALFORMED is a 400 and PROOF_REPLAY_CACHE_FULL a 503, and the
rest are here.
SCOPED_CREDENTIAL_EXPIRED -- a scoped browser credential passed its fixed lifetime. Use
does not extend it: an idle timeout would be refreshed by exactly the traffic a stolen
handle produces.
403
Authenticated, and refused. The codes differ in what they say about where the refusal
came from: ACCESS_DENIED, PRINCIPAL_DISABLED and DELEGATOR_REFUSED are the key
server's -- the last one on a DELEGATED session whose delegator has since been disabled,
lost its DELEGATION flag, been unenrolled or had its certificate revoked (ADR-0123); its
detail is the key server's sentence naming the delegator, and no new login helps until
an administrator restores it -- while
NOT_WRITABLE, BUILT_IN_PRINCIPAL, OWN_ACCOUNT and
OBJECT_NOT_IN_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE are decided by the Gateway before anything is sent.
500
A fault rather than a refusal.
OP_FAILED is the catch-all: the key server refused in words that match no classified
pattern, so the Gateway cannot say more than that the operation did not happen. Some key
server refusals that are conceptually a caller error arrive here rather than as a 4xx,
because the wire carries no distinguishing code -- where a route can recognise one from
its message it maps it, and each such mapping is documented on the operation.
503
A capacity ceiling or a missing deployment prerequisite. retryable says which.
A scope of session or process names the ceiling that was hit, and the response
carries Retry-After.
Error handling
Every failure answers JSON carrying at least code and detail. Match on code — detail is written for a human debugging the call and its wording is not part of the contract. See the error model.
| Status | Meaning |
|---|---|
400 | The request was refused before anything was sent to the key server. Most 400s on this surface carry code: BAD_REQUEST and a detail naming the field and saying what the key server would otherwise have done with it. A large share of them exist because the value would have been ACCEPTED downstream and quietly meant something else -- an empty string that reaches the wire as "mint a new key", a zero-length identifier that names no object, a numeric flag word that clears bits the caller did not name. INVALID_ARGUMENT is the one 400 that DID reach the key server: the key server itself refused the argument (ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT), and detail is its own sentence. On POST /api/certificates/enroll that is a certificate that cannot authenticate -- certificate not permitted for authentication: keyUsage is present without digitalSignature (...), ... extendedKeyUsage is present without clientAuth (...), or certificate expired at enrolment: notAfter <UTC> ... -- and a multi-certificate body that carries one such leaf persists nothing. |
401 | No live session, or a DPoP proof that did not verify. SESSION_NOT_FOUND -- the credential names no session this Gateway holds. SESSION_EXPIRED -- it aged out. Both carry reauth: true; obtain a new credential rather than retrying. PROOF_* -- the sender constraint refused. See the DPoP section of this document for the full table; PROOF_MALFORMED is a 400 and PROOF_REPLAY_CACHE_FULL a 503, and the rest are here. SCOPED_CREDENTIAL_EXPIRED -- a scoped browser credential passed its fixed lifetime. Use does not extend it: an idle timeout would be refreshed by exactly the traffic a stolen handle produces. |
403 | Authenticated, and refused. The codes differ in what they say about where the refusal came from: ACCESS_DENIED, PRINCIPAL_DISABLED and DELEGATOR_REFUSED are the key server's -- the last one on a DELEGATED session whose delegator has since been disabled, lost its DELEGATION flag, been unenrolled or had its certificate revoked (ADR-0123); its detail is the key server's sentence naming the delegator, and no new login helps until an administrator restores it -- while NOT_WRITABLE, BUILT_IN_PRINCIPAL, OWN_ACCOUNT and OBJECT_NOT_IN_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE are decided by the Gateway before anything is sent. |
500 | A fault rather than a refusal. OP_FAILED is the catch-all: the key server refused in words that match no classified pattern, so the Gateway cannot say more than that the operation did not happen. Some key server refusals that are conceptually a caller error arrive here rather than as a 4xx, because the wire carries no distinguishing code -- where a route can recognise one from its message it maps it, and each such mapping is documented on the operation. |
503 | A capacity ceiling or a missing deployment prerequisite. retryable says which. A scope of session or process names the ceiling that was hit, and the response carries Retry-After. |