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POST /api/revocation/crls

Import one or more DER CRLs into the key server's revocation store.

Every CRL is validated ONCE, when it arrives -- its issuer must be a trusted anchor that may sign a CRL, its signature must verify, and it must be newer than the evidence already held for that issuer -- and what survives is stored as indexed revocation facts. The import is all or nothing: one refused CRL persists none of the others.

Verified by a FRESH evidence read on the same session, never by the call returning: every accepted CRL must be listed by its hash, or the answer is 409 NOT_VERIFIED.

A principal whose ENROLLED certificate an imported CRL names is refused at its NEXT operation, on every key server sharing the key database (ADR-0115).

Who may call this is the key server's decision: IMPORT_CRL is a management operation authorised by role -- Security Officer on the shipped roles.

Authentication​

Send the session id as Authorization: Bearer <session id>, and an RFC 9449 DPoP proof in the DPoP header if your session is bound to a key. The two are required together, not as alternatives — see Authenticating and Proving you hold your key.

This surface sets no cookie

There is no session cookie on any response and none is read on any request. Do not set credentials: "include" on a browser fetch.

Request​

FieldTypeRequiredDescription
crlsarray of stringyesEach entry one DER-encoded CRL, base64. Not PEM -- a PEM block is refused by name (CRL_NOT_DER).

Example

{
  "crls": [
    "..."
  ]
}

Responses​

200​

Every CRL was accepted and is listed by a fresh evidence read.

FieldTypeRequiredDescription
importedtrue (constant)yes
countintegeryes
evidencearray of RevocationEvidenceyesOne stored CRL, as the key server validated and indexed it. Every time is UTC, YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ.
detailstringno

Example

{
  "imported": true,
  "count": 0,
  "evidence": [
    {
      "issuer": "...",
      "digest": "...",
      "crlNumber": "...",
      "thisUpdate": "...",
      "nextUpdate": "...",
      "provenance": "...",
      "acceptedAt": "...",
      "entries": 0,
      "crlHash": "..."
    }
  ],
  "detail": "..."
}

400​

Refused before anything was sent: CRLS_REQUIRED (not an array), CRLS_EMPTY, TOO_MANY_CRLS (more than 16 -- split the import), CRL_NOT_DER (a PEM block), BAD_BASE64, EMPTY_ENTRY, NOT_DER (not a DER SEQUENCE). index names the entry.

401​

No live session, or a DPoP proof that did not verify.

SESSION_NOT_FOUND -- the credential names no session this Gateway holds. SESSION_EXPIRED -- it aged out. Both carry reauth: true; obtain a new credential rather than retrying.

PROOF_* -- the sender constraint refused. See the DPoP section of this document for the full table; PROOF_MALFORMED is a 400 and PROOF_REPLAY_CACHE_FULL a 503, and the rest are here.

SCOPED_CREDENTIAL_EXPIRED -- a scoped browser credential passed its fixed lifetime. Use does not extend it: an idle timeout would be refreshed by exactly the traffic a stolen handle produces.

403​

Authenticated, and refused. The codes differ in what they say about where the refusal came from: ACCESS_DENIED, PRINCIPAL_DISABLED and DELEGATOR_REFUSED are the key server's -- the last one on a DELEGATED session whose delegator has since been disabled, lost its DELEGATION flag, been unenrolled or had its certificate revoked (ADR-0123); its detail is the key server's sentence naming the delegator, and no new login helps until an administrator restores it -- while NOT_WRITABLE, BUILT_IN_PRINCIPAL, OWN_ACCOUNT and OBJECT_NOT_IN_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE are decided by the Gateway before anything is sent.

409​

NOT_VERIFIED -- the import answered, and a fresh evidence read does not list every accepted CRL.

422​

CRL_REFUSED -- the key server refused a CRL and persisted NOTHING. detail is its own sentence: the CRL is not newer than the stored evidence, its issuer is not a trusted anchor, its signature does not verify under that anchor, or it uses a construct the key server cannot honour (an indirect or partitioned CRL, a critical extension it does not know).

500​

A fault rather than a refusal.

OP_FAILED is the catch-all: the key server refused in words that match no classified pattern, so the Gateway cannot say more than that the operation did not happen. Some key server refusals that are conceptually a caller error arrive here rather than as a 4xx, because the wire carries no distinguishing code -- where a route can recognise one from its message it maps it, and each such mapping is documented on the operation.

503​

A capacity ceiling or a missing deployment prerequisite. retryable says which.

A scope of session or process names the ceiling that was hit, and the response carries Retry-After.

Error handling​

Every failure answers JSON carrying at least code and detail. Match on code — detail is written for a human debugging the call and its wording is not part of the contract. See the error model.

StatusMeaning
400Refused before anything was sent: CRLS_REQUIRED (not an array), CRLS_EMPTY, TOO_MANY_CRLS (more than 16 -- split the import), CRL_NOT_DER (a PEM block), BAD_BASE64, EMPTY_ENTRY, NOT_DER (not a DER SEQUENCE). index names the entry.
401No live session, or a DPoP proof that did not verify. SESSION_NOT_FOUND -- the credential names no session this Gateway holds. SESSION_EXPIRED -- it aged out. Both carry reauth: true; obtain a new credential rather than retrying. PROOF_* -- the sender constraint refused. See the DPoP section of this document for the full table; PROOF_MALFORMED is a 400 and PROOF_REPLAY_CACHE_FULL a 503, and the rest are here. SCOPED_CREDENTIAL_EXPIRED -- a scoped browser credential passed its fixed lifetime. Use does not extend it: an idle timeout would be refreshed by exactly the traffic a stolen handle produces.
403Authenticated, and refused. The codes differ in what they say about where the refusal came from: ACCESS_DENIED, PRINCIPAL_DISABLED and DELEGATOR_REFUSED are the key server's -- the last one on a DELEGATED session whose delegator has since been disabled, lost its DELEGATION flag, been unenrolled or had its certificate revoked (ADR-0123); its detail is the key server's sentence naming the delegator, and no new login helps until an administrator restores it -- while NOT_WRITABLE, BUILT_IN_PRINCIPAL, OWN_ACCOUNT and OBJECT_NOT_IN_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE are decided by the Gateway before anything is sent.
409NOT_VERIFIED -- the import answered, and a fresh evidence read does not list every accepted CRL.
422CRL_REFUSED -- the key server refused a CRL and persisted NOTHING. detail is its own sentence: the CRL is not newer than the stored evidence, its issuer is not a trusted anchor, its signature does not verify under that anchor, or it uses a construct the key server cannot honour (an indirect or partitioned CRL, a critical extension it does not know).
500A fault rather than a refusal. OP_FAILED is the catch-all: the key server refused in words that match no classified pattern, so the Gateway cannot say more than that the operation did not happen. Some key server refusals that are conceptually a caller error arrive here rather than as a 4xx, because the wire carries no distinguishing code -- where a route can recognise one from its message it maps it, and each such mapping is documented on the operation.
503A capacity ceiling or a missing deployment prerequisite. retryable says which. A scope of session or process names the ceiling that was hit, and the response carries Retry-After.