PUT /api/principals/{id}/roles

REPLACE the whole set of roles a principal holds.

This is a REPLACE, not an add. The ids sent are the whole set, and an EMPTY ARRAY CLEARS every role the principal holds. roleIds is mandatory and an absent field is refused rather than treated as a clear -- the request carries nothing else, so an absent field would make it mean nothing at all.

The write is verified by a fresh read; the underlying call resolves nothing.

Three known causes of a 409, two of them silent at the key server: the target is SYSTEM-DEFINED (the key server skips those and reports success), or the request named a role id that does not exist. The third is not silent and arrives as a 500 rather than a 409: the key server refuses ANY update whose target is the calling session's own principal.

Authentication

Send the session id as Authorization: Bearer <session id>, and an RFC 9449 DPoP proof in the DPoP header if your session is bound to a key. The two are required together, not as alternatives — see Authenticating and Proving you hold your key.

This surface sets no cookie

There is no session cookie on any response and none is read on any request. Do not set credentials: "include" on a browser fetch.

Parameters

Name	In	Required	Type	Description
id	path	yes	string	A principal id as 16 hex digits. This is the id field of a principal projection -- NOT the principalId decimal string beside it. The two are the same eight bytes in two spellings, and only the hex one is a path segment.

Request

Field	Type	Required	Description
roleIds	array of string	yes	The WHOLE set. An empty array clears all roles.

Example

{
  "roleIds": [
    "..."
  ]
}

Responses

200

Replaced, and verified by a fresh read.

Field	Type	Required	Description
code	string	no	Absent on success.
id	string	no
requested	array of string	no	The WHOLE set that was sent. An empty array was a request to clear.
saved	boolean	no
observed	array of string	no	What a fresh read shows the principal holding now.
reason	string	no	Present when the principal type cannot carry roles at all.
principal	Principal or variant	no
detail	string	no

principal — Principal

Field	Type	Required	Description
id	string	no	16 hex digits.
principalId	string or null	no	The same eight bytes as a decimal string. A string, so that an id above 2^53 survives.
systemId	integer or null	no	Assigned by the key server at setup. READ IT FROM THE SERVER; a hardcoded value addresses a principal that does not exist and yields a misleading "unknown principal".
className	string or null	no	The key server's own class name -- UserAndPasswordInfo, TransportPrincipalInfo, LdapPrincipalInfo, XAuthPrincipalInfo or GroupInfo.
name	string or null	no
disabled	boolean or null	no
roleIds	array of string	no
groupIds	array of string	no

Example

{
  "code": "...",
  "id": "...",
  "requested": [
    "..."
  ],
  "saved": true,
  "observed": [
    "..."
  ],
  "reason": "...",
  "principal": {
    "id": "...",
    "principalId": "...",
    "systemId": 0,
    "className": "...",
    "name": "...",
    "disabled": true,
    "roleIds": [
      "..."
    ],
    "groupIds": [
      "..."
    ]
  },
  "detail": "..."
}

400

BAD_REQUEST -- the id is not 16 hex digits, roleIds is absent or not an array, or an entry is not 16 hex digits.

401

No live session, a DPoP proof that did not verify, or a certificate session whose certificate the key server now refuses.

SESSION_NOT_FOUND -- the credential names no session this Gateway holds. SESSION_EXPIRED -- it aged out. Both carry reauth: true; obtain a new credential rather than retrying.

PROOF_* -- the sender constraint refused. See the DPoP section of this document for the full table; PROOF_MALFORMED is a 400 and PROOF_REPLAY_CACHE_FULL a 503, and the rest are here.

SCOPED_CREDENTIAL_EXPIRED -- a scoped browser credential passed its fixed lifetime. Use does not extend it: an idle timeout would be refreshed by exactly the traffic a stolen handle produces.

CERTIFICATE_REVOKED -- on a session established by certificate login, the key server re-checks the certificate that session was established with on its operations, and it is now named by revocation evidence (ADR 0115). detail is the key server's sentence. Every later operation of the session is refused the same way; log in with a different certificate.

403

Authenticated, and refused. The codes differ in what they say about where the refusal came from: ACCESS_DENIED, PRINCIPAL_DISABLED and DELEGATOR_REFUSED are the key server's -- the last one on a DELEGATED session whose delegator has since been disabled, lost its DELEGATION flag, been unenrolled or had its certificate revoked (ADR-0123); its detail is the key server's sentence naming the delegator, and no new login helps until an administrator restores it. REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE and REVOCATION_EVIDENCE_STALE are the key server's too, on a session established by certificate login: the same re-check found no current revocation evidence for that certificate's issuer under a policy that requires it (ADR 0115) -- the credential is not what was refused, and an operator importing a current CRL for the issuer is what helps -- while NOT_WRITABLE, BUILT_IN_PRINCIPAL, OWN_ACCOUNT and OBJECT_NOT_IN_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE are decided by the Gateway before anything is sent.

404

NOT_FOUND.

409

The read-back does not agree with what was sent, or this principal type cannot carry roles at all (reason says so).

500

A fault rather than a refusal.

OP_FAILED is the catch-all: the key server refused in words that match no classified pattern, so the Gateway cannot say more than that the operation did not happen. Some key server refusals that are conceptually a caller error arrive here rather than as a 4xx, because the wire carries no distinguishing code -- where a route can recognise one from its message it maps it, and each such mapping is documented on the operation.

503

A capacity ceiling or a missing deployment prerequisite. retryable says which.

A scope of session or process names the ceiling that was hit, and the response carries Retry-After.

BUILD_NOT_ADMITTED (scope: process, retryable: true, Retry-After): the key server does not admit this Gateway's client build. Every key-server connection the Gateway opens attests the signed release it runs (TE_RELEASE_MANIFEST) right after it authenticates; while that attestation is refused -- the release is not registered at the key server's code-signing level, the level was raised under it, or the installed files no longer match the signed manifest -- every route but GET /api/health and GET /api/ready answers this, and detail names the cause. It is never a 401 or a 403: no credential or role of the caller's is at fault. The Gateway re-attempts on a timer and recovers without a restart once the key server admits it; GET /api/ready says when.

Error handling

Every failure answers JSON carrying at least code and detail. Match on code — detail is written for a human debugging the call and its wording is not part of the contract. See the error model.

Status	Meaning
400	BAD_REQUEST -- the id is not 16 hex digits, roleIds is absent or not an array, or an entry is not 16 hex digits.
401	No live session, a DPoP proof that did not verify, or a certificate session whose certificate the key server now refuses. SESSION_NOT_FOUND -- the credential names no session this Gateway holds. SESSION_EXPIRED -- it aged out. Both carry reauth: true; obtain a new credential rather than retrying. PROOF_* -- the sender constraint refused. See the DPoP section of this document for the full table; PROOF_MALFORMED is a 400 and PROOF_REPLAY_CACHE_FULL a 503, and the rest are here. SCOPED_CREDENTIAL_EXPIRED -- a scoped browser credential passed its fixed lifetime. Use does not extend it: an idle timeout would be refreshed by exactly the traffic a stolen handle produces. CERTIFICATE_REVOKED -- on a session established by certificate login, the key server re-checks the certificate that session was established with on its operations, and it is now named by revocation evidence (ADR 0115). detail is the key server's sentence. Every later operation of the session is refused the same way; log in with a different certificate.
403	Authenticated, and refused. The codes differ in what they say about where the refusal came from: ACCESS_DENIED, PRINCIPAL_DISABLED and DELEGATOR_REFUSED are the key server's -- the last one on a DELEGATED session whose delegator has since been disabled, lost its DELEGATION flag, been unenrolled or had its certificate revoked (ADR-0123); its detail is the key server's sentence naming the delegator, and no new login helps until an administrator restores it. REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE and REVOCATION_EVIDENCE_STALE are the key server's too, on a session established by certificate login: the same re-check found no current revocation evidence for that certificate's issuer under a policy that requires it (ADR 0115) -- the credential is not what was refused, and an operator importing a current CRL for the issuer is what helps -- while NOT_WRITABLE, BUILT_IN_PRINCIPAL, OWN_ACCOUNT and OBJECT_NOT_IN_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE are decided by the Gateway before anything is sent.
404	NOT_FOUND.
409	The read-back does not agree with what was sent, or this principal type cannot carry roles at all (reason says so).
500	A fault rather than a refusal. OP_FAILED is the catch-all: the key server refused in words that match no classified pattern, so the Gateway cannot say more than that the operation did not happen. Some key server refusals that are conceptually a caller error arrive here rather than as a 4xx, because the wire carries no distinguishing code -- where a route can recognise one from its message it maps it, and each such mapping is documented on the operation.
503	A capacity ceiling or a missing deployment prerequisite. retryable says which. A scope of session or process names the ceiling that was hit, and the response carries Retry-After. BUILD_NOT_ADMITTED (scope: process, retryable: true, Retry-After): the key server does not admit this Gateway's client build. Every key-server connection the Gateway opens attests the signed release it runs (TE_RELEASE_MANIFEST) right after it authenticates; while that attestation is refused -- the release is not registered at the key server's code-signing level, the level was raised under it, or the installed files no longer match the signed manifest -- every route but GET /api/health and GET /api/ready answers this, and detail names the cause. It is never a 401 or a 403: no credential or role of the caller's is at fault. The Gateway re-attempts on a timer and recovers without a restart once the key server admits it; GET /api/ready says when.