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POST /api/certificates/from-certificate

Parse submitted DER certificates into certificate objects. Stores nothing.

WARNING: this stores nothing and looks nothing up. It is a PARSE -- one object per submitted certificate. If you meant to enrol a certificate, that is POST /api/certificates/enroll.

WARNING: status on these rows describes the handler, not the certificate. The key server sets the "regular end-entity" status on every object it builds through this path, so a CA certificate parsed here still reads Regular.

Each entry must be base64 of a raw DER X.509 certificate. Three shapes are refused at the door rather than forwarded, because each produces a 500 naming neither the entry nor the form: a zero-length entry; base64 of a PEM BLOCK (base64 of PEM is base64 of base64 -- take the text BETWEEN the BEGIN and END lines, remove the newlines, and send that); and bytes not beginning with 0x30, which are not a DER SEQUENCE. PEM is refused rather than un-armoured, because stripping it silently would leave you believing you had sent DER.

An empty certificates array is refused: the underlying call resolves an empty result WITHOUT TOUCHING THE WIRE, so it would be answered 200-with-nothing having asked the key server nothing.

If this route answers 500 with an "unknown function" message, the operation is not enabled on that key server -- either the deployed configuration predates it or the binary does. The message cannot tell those apart, because the authorization registry is the intersection of the two; check both.

Authentication​

Send the session id as Authorization: Bearer <session id>, and an RFC 9449 DPoP proof in the DPoP header if your session is bound to a key. The two are required together, not as alternatives — see Authenticating and Proving you hold your key.

This surface sets no cookie

There is no session cookie on any response and none is read on any request. Do not set credentials: "include" on a browser fetch.

Request​

FieldTypeRequiredDescription
certificatesarray of stringyesbase64 of one raw DER X.509 certificate. Not PEM.
includeBodiesbooleanno

Example

{
  "certificates": [
    "..."
  ],
  "includeBodies": true
}

Responses​

200​

One certificate object per submitted certificate.

FieldTypeRequiredDescription
lookupstring (by-id, by-subject, by-transport-principal, from-certificate)yesWhich lookup answered, echoed so a response is self-describing.
systemIdintegerno
principalIdstringno
subjectstringnoEchoed
countintegeryes
bodiesIncludedbooleanyes
certificatesarray of CertificateyesA certificate object as the key server holds or parses it.
detailstringno
submittedintegerno

Example

{
  "lookup": "by-id",
  "systemId": 0,
  "principalId": "...",
  "subject": "...",
  "count": 0,
  "bodiesIncluded": true,
  "certificates": [
    {
      "certificateId": "...",
      "className": "...",
      "subject": "...",
      "issuer": "...",
      "publicKeyType": "...",
      "serialNumber": "...",
      "certHash": "...",
      "effectiveDate": "...",
      "expirationDate": "...",
      "status": 0,
      "statusLabel": "...",
      "certificate": "...",
      "request": "..."
    }
  ],
  "detail": "...",
  "submitted": 0
}

400​

The request was refused before anything was sent to the key server.

Most 400s on this surface carry code: BAD_REQUEST and a detail naming the field and saying what the key server would otherwise have done with it. A large share of them exist because the value would have been ACCEPTED downstream and quietly meant something else -- an empty string that reaches the wire as "mint a new key", a zero-length identifier that names no object, a numeric flag word that clears bits the caller did not name.

401​

No live session, or a DPoP proof that did not verify.

SESSION_NOT_FOUND -- the credential names no session this Gateway holds. SESSION_EXPIRED -- it aged out. Both carry reauth: true; obtain a new credential rather than retrying.

PROOF_* -- the sender constraint refused. See the DPoP section of this document for the full table; PROOF_MALFORMED is a 400 and PROOF_REPLAY_CACHE_FULL a 503, and the rest are here.

SCOPED_CREDENTIAL_EXPIRED -- a scoped browser credential passed its fixed lifetime. Use does not extend it: an idle timeout would be refreshed by exactly the traffic a stolen handle produces.

403​

Authenticated, and refused. The codes differ in what they say about where the refusal came from: ACCESS_DENIED and PRINCIPAL_DISABLED are the key server's, while NOT_WRITABLE, BUILT_IN_PRINCIPAL, OWN_ACCOUNT and OBJECT_NOT_IN_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE are decided by the Gateway before anything is sent.

500​

A fault rather than a refusal.

OP_FAILED is the catch-all: the key server refused in words that match no classified pattern, so the Gateway cannot say more than that the operation did not happen. Some key server refusals that are conceptually a caller error arrive here rather than as a 4xx, because the wire carries no distinguishing code -- where a route can recognise one from its message it maps it, and each such mapping is documented on the operation.

503​

A capacity ceiling or a missing deployment prerequisite. retryable says which.

A scope of session or process names the ceiling that was hit, and the response carries Retry-After.

Error handling​

Every failure answers JSON carrying at least code and detail. Match on code — detail is written for a human debugging the call and its wording is not part of the contract. See the error model.

StatusMeaning
400The request was refused before anything was sent to the key server. Most 400s on this surface carry code: BAD_REQUEST and a detail naming the field and saying what the key server would otherwise have done with it. A large share of them exist because the value would have been ACCEPTED downstream and quietly meant something else -- an empty string that reaches the wire as "mint a new key", a zero-length identifier that names no object, a numeric flag word that clears bits the caller did not name.
401No live session, or a DPoP proof that did not verify. SESSION_NOT_FOUND -- the credential names no session this Gateway holds. SESSION_EXPIRED -- it aged out. Both carry reauth: true; obtain a new credential rather than retrying. PROOF_* -- the sender constraint refused. See the DPoP section of this document for the full table; PROOF_MALFORMED is a 400 and PROOF_REPLAY_CACHE_FULL a 503, and the rest are here. SCOPED_CREDENTIAL_EXPIRED -- a scoped browser credential passed its fixed lifetime. Use does not extend it: an idle timeout would be refreshed by exactly the traffic a stolen handle produces.
403Authenticated, and refused. The codes differ in what they say about where the refusal came from: ACCESS_DENIED and PRINCIPAL_DISABLED are the key server's, while NOT_WRITABLE, BUILT_IN_PRINCIPAL, OWN_ACCOUNT and OBJECT_NOT_IN_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE are decided by the Gateway before anything is sent.
500A fault rather than a refusal. OP_FAILED is the catch-all: the key server refused in words that match no classified pattern, so the Gateway cannot say more than that the operation did not happen. Some key server refusals that are conceptually a caller error arrive here rather than as a 4xx, because the wire carries no distinguishing code -- where a route can recognise one from its message it maps it, and each such mapping is documented on the operation.
503A capacity ceiling or a missing deployment prerequisite. retryable says which. A scope of session or process names the ceiling that was hit, and the response carries Retry-After.