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POST /api/trusted-cas/remove

Remove a CA from the trusted list.

Removes the CA named by certificateId, and verifies by ABSENCE from a fresh list read.

certificateId is the value GET /api/trusted-cas returns -- canonical base64 of an 8-byte id. NOT the lower-case hex a thick client renders, and not a number.

WARNING: removing a CA does not un-enrol anything. Leaves already enrolled keep their certificate object and their transport principal; this removes ONE record of the two. To retire an identity, disable or remove its principal.

WARNING: on this route the listener-lag caveat is the security-relevant direction. gone: true means the key server no longer LISTS this CA. It does not mean leaves signed by it can no longer connect: until the key server is restarted, they still can.

Authentication​

Send the session id as Authorization: Bearer <session id>, and an RFC 9449 DPoP proof in the DPoP header if your session is bound to a key. The two are required together, not as alternatives — see Authenticating and Proving you hold your key.

This surface sets no cookie

There is no session cookie on any response and none is read on any request. Do not set credentials: "include" on a browser fetch.

Request​

FieldTypeRequiredDescription
certificateIdstringyesCanonical base64 of an 8-byte id

Example

{
  "certificateId": "..."
}

Responses​

200​

The CA is no longer listed, verified by a fresh read.

FieldTypeRequiredDescription
gonetrue (constant)yes
certificateIdstringyes
listCountBeforeintegeryes
listCountAfterintegeryes
echoedObjectsinteger or nullno
trustedCAobjectyesThe row as it stood BEFORE the removal, so the answer names what went.
detailstringno

trustedCA object

FieldTypeRequiredDescription
certificateIdstring or nullnoCanonical base64 of an 8-byte id. This is the spelling the trust routes take. It is NOT the lower-case hex a thick client renders for the same field; the two do not interoperate byte-for-byte.
classNamestring or nullno
subjectstring or nullnoThe FULL stored DN, slash-prefixed and slash-separated, e.g. /CN=teFileX509/O=ERUCES.
issuerstring or nullno
publicKeyTypestring or nullno
serialNumberstring or nullnobase64
certHashstring or nullnobase64
effectiveDatestring or nullno
expirationDatestring or nullno
statusinteger or nullnoThe certificate-object status WORD, not an ok/error flag. See statusLabel.
statusLabelstring or nullnoOne of: CA, Regular, Saved request, Trusted server, Expired.
certificatestring or nullnoThe DER body, base64. Present only when includeBodies was true.
requeststring or nullnoThe stored CSR, base64. Present only when includeBodies was true.
revocationDigeststring or nullnoPresent on GET /api/trusted-cas only. The digest the key server keys this CA's revocation evidence and per-issuer policy on -- UPPER-CASE hex, SHA-256 of the DER, or SHA-384 for an EC key of 384 bits or more. It is the {digest} of PUT /api/revocation/issuers/{digest}/policy. Null when the stored body does not parse.

Example

{
  "gone": true,
  "certificateId": "...",
  "listCountBefore": 0,
  "listCountAfter": 0,
  "echoedObjects": 0,
  "trustedCA": {
    "certificateId": "...",
    "className": "...",
    "subject": "...",
    "issuer": "...",
    "publicKeyType": "...",
    "serialNumber": "...",
    "certHash": "...",
    "effectiveDate": "...",
    "expirationDate": "...",
    "status": 0,
    "statusLabel": "...",
    "certificate": "...",
    "request": "...",
    "revocationDigest": "..."
  },
  "detail": "..."
}

400​

The request was refused before anything was sent to the key server.

Most 400s on this surface carry code: BAD_REQUEST and a detail naming the field and saying what the key server would otherwise have done with it. A large share of them exist because the value would have been ACCEPTED downstream and quietly meant something else -- an empty string that reaches the wire as "mint a new key", a zero-length identifier that names no object, a numeric flag word that clears bits the caller did not name.

INVALID_ARGUMENT is the one 400 that DID reach the key server: the key server itself refused the argument (ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT), and detail is its own sentence. On POST /api/certificates/enroll that is a certificate that cannot authenticate -- certificate not permitted for authentication: keyUsage is present without digitalSignature (...), ... extendedKeyUsage is present without clientAuth (...), or certificate expired at enrolment: notAfter <UTC> ... -- and a multi-certificate body that carries one such leaf persists nothing.

401​

No live session, a DPoP proof that did not verify, or a certificate session whose certificate the key server now refuses.

SESSION_NOT_FOUND -- the credential names no session this Gateway holds. SESSION_EXPIRED -- it aged out. Both carry reauth: true; obtain a new credential rather than retrying.

PROOF_* -- the sender constraint refused. See the DPoP section of this document for the full table; PROOF_MALFORMED is a 400 and PROOF_REPLAY_CACHE_FULL a 503, and the rest are here.

SCOPED_CREDENTIAL_EXPIRED -- a scoped browser credential passed its fixed lifetime. Use does not extend it: an idle timeout would be refreshed by exactly the traffic a stolen handle produces.

CERTIFICATE_REVOKED -- on a session established by certificate login, the key server re-checks the certificate that session was established with on its operations, and it is now named by revocation evidence (ADR 0115). detail is the key server's sentence. Every later operation of the session is refused the same way; log in with a different certificate.

403​

Authenticated, and refused. The codes differ in what they say about where the refusal came from: ACCESS_DENIED, PRINCIPAL_DISABLED and DELEGATOR_REFUSED are the key server's -- the last one on a DELEGATED session whose delegator has since been disabled, lost its DELEGATION flag, been unenrolled or had its certificate revoked (ADR-0123); its detail is the key server's sentence naming the delegator, and no new login helps until an administrator restores it. REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE and REVOCATION_EVIDENCE_STALE are the key server's too, on a session established by certificate login: the same re-check found no current revocation evidence for that certificate's issuer under a policy that requires it (ADR 0115) -- the credential is not what was refused, and an operator importing a current CRL for the issuer is what helps -- while NOT_WRITABLE, BUILT_IN_PRINCIPAL, OWN_ACCOUNT and OBJECT_NOT_IN_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE are decided by the Gateway before anything is sent.

404​

NOT_TRUSTED -- no CA with that id is in the list. Established by READING the list, not inferred from a failed removal; nothing was sent to the key server. This is a DIFFERENT FACT from the 409.

409​

NOT_REMOVED -- the CA WAS in the list, the removal resolved, and a fresh read still contains it. gone comes from that second read and from nothing else.

500​

A fault rather than a refusal.

OP_FAILED is the catch-all: the key server refused in words that match no classified pattern, so the Gateway cannot say more than that the operation did not happen. Some key server refusals that are conceptually a caller error arrive here rather than as a 4xx, because the wire carries no distinguishing code -- where a route can recognise one from its message it maps it, and each such mapping is documented on the operation.

503​

A capacity ceiling or a missing deployment prerequisite. retryable says which.

A scope of session or process names the ceiling that was hit, and the response carries Retry-After.

BUILD_NOT_ADMITTED (scope: process, retryable: true, Retry-After): the key server does not admit this Gateway's client build. Every key-server connection the Gateway opens attests the signed release it runs (TE_RELEASE_MANIFEST) right after it authenticates; while that attestation is refused -- the release is not registered at the key server's code-signing level, the level was raised under it, or the installed files no longer match the signed manifest -- every route but GET /api/health and GET /api/ready answers this, and detail names the cause. It is never a 401 or a 403: no credential or role of the caller's is at fault. The Gateway re-attempts on a timer and recovers without a restart once the key server admits it; GET /api/ready says when.

Error handling​

Every failure answers JSON carrying at least code and detail. Match on code — detail is written for a human debugging the call and its wording is not part of the contract. See the error model.

StatusMeaning
400The request was refused before anything was sent to the key server. Most 400s on this surface carry code: BAD_REQUEST and a detail naming the field and saying what the key server would otherwise have done with it. A large share of them exist because the value would have been ACCEPTED downstream and quietly meant something else -- an empty string that reaches the wire as "mint a new key", a zero-length identifier that names no object, a numeric flag word that clears bits the caller did not name. INVALID_ARGUMENT is the one 400 that DID reach the key server: the key server itself refused the argument (ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT), and detail is its own sentence. On POST /api/certificates/enroll that is a certificate that cannot authenticate -- certificate not permitted for authentication: keyUsage is present without digitalSignature (...), ... extendedKeyUsage is present without clientAuth (...), or certificate expired at enrolment: notAfter <UTC> ... -- and a multi-certificate body that carries one such leaf persists nothing.
401No live session, a DPoP proof that did not verify, or a certificate session whose certificate the key server now refuses. SESSION_NOT_FOUND -- the credential names no session this Gateway holds. SESSION_EXPIRED -- it aged out. Both carry reauth: true; obtain a new credential rather than retrying. PROOF_* -- the sender constraint refused. See the DPoP section of this document for the full table; PROOF_MALFORMED is a 400 and PROOF_REPLAY_CACHE_FULL a 503, and the rest are here. SCOPED_CREDENTIAL_EXPIRED -- a scoped browser credential passed its fixed lifetime. Use does not extend it: an idle timeout would be refreshed by exactly the traffic a stolen handle produces. CERTIFICATE_REVOKED -- on a session established by certificate login, the key server re-checks the certificate that session was established with on its operations, and it is now named by revocation evidence (ADR 0115). detail is the key server's sentence. Every later operation of the session is refused the same way; log in with a different certificate.
403Authenticated, and refused. The codes differ in what they say about where the refusal came from: ACCESS_DENIED, PRINCIPAL_DISABLED and DELEGATOR_REFUSED are the key server's -- the last one on a DELEGATED session whose delegator has since been disabled, lost its DELEGATION flag, been unenrolled or had its certificate revoked (ADR-0123); its detail is the key server's sentence naming the delegator, and no new login helps until an administrator restores it. REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE and REVOCATION_EVIDENCE_STALE are the key server's too, on a session established by certificate login: the same re-check found no current revocation evidence for that certificate's issuer under a policy that requires it (ADR 0115) -- the credential is not what was refused, and an operator importing a current CRL for the issuer is what helps -- while NOT_WRITABLE, BUILT_IN_PRINCIPAL, OWN_ACCOUNT and OBJECT_NOT_IN_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE are decided by the Gateway before anything is sent.
404NOT_TRUSTED -- no CA with that id is in the list. Established by READING the list, not inferred from a failed removal; nothing was sent to the key server. This is a DIFFERENT FACT from the 409.
409NOT_REMOVED -- the CA WAS in the list, the removal resolved, and a fresh read still contains it. gone comes from that second read and from nothing else.
500A fault rather than a refusal. OP_FAILED is the catch-all: the key server refused in words that match no classified pattern, so the Gateway cannot say more than that the operation did not happen. Some key server refusals that are conceptually a caller error arrive here rather than as a 4xx, because the wire carries no distinguishing code -- where a route can recognise one from its message it maps it, and each such mapping is documented on the operation.
503A capacity ceiling or a missing deployment prerequisite. retryable says which. A scope of session or process names the ceiling that was hit, and the response carries Retry-After. BUILD_NOT_ADMITTED (scope: process, retryable: true, Retry-After): the key server does not admit this Gateway's client build. Every key-server connection the Gateway opens attests the signed release it runs (TE_RELEASE_MANIFEST) right after it authenticates; while that attestation is refused -- the release is not registered at the key server's code-signing level, the level was raised under it, or the installed files no longer match the signed manifest -- every route but GET /api/health and GET /api/ready answers this, and detail names the cause. It is never a 401 or a 403: no credential or role of the caller's is at fault. The Gateway re-attempts on a timer and recovers without a restart once the key server admits it; GET /api/ready says when.